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Abstract Semi-quantum key distribution protocols are allowed to set up a secure
secret key between two users. Compared with their full quantum counterparts,
one of the two users is restricted to perform some “classical” or “semi-quantum”
operations, which makes them potentially easily realizable by using less quantum
resource. However, the semi-quantum key distribution protocols mainly rely on a
two-way quantum channel. The eavesdropper has two opportunities to intercept
the quantum states transmitted in the quantum communication stage. It may al-
low the eavesdropper to get more information and make the security analysis more
complicated. In the past ten years, many semi-quantum key distribution proto-
cols have been proposed and proved to be robust. However, there are few works
concerned about their unconditional security. It is doubted that how secure the
semi-quantum ones are and how much noise they can tolerate to establish a secure
secret key. In this paper, we prove the unconditional security of a single-state semi-
quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Zou et al. in [Phys. Rev. A. 79].
We present a complete proof from information theory aspect by deriving a lower
bound of the protocol’s key rate in the asymptotic scenario. Using this bound, we
figure out an error threshold value such that all error rates that are less than this
threshold value, the secure secret key can be established between the legitimate
users definitely. Otherwise, the users should abort the protocol. We make an illus-
tration of the protocol under the circumstance that the reverse quantum channel is
a depolarizing one with parameter q. Additionally, we compare the error threshold
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value with some full quantum protocols and several existing semi-quantum ones
whose unconditional security proofs have been provided recently.
Keywords Semi-quantum key distribution protocol · Von Neumann entropy ·
Secret key rate · Error rate · Measurement
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are designed to share secret keys be-
tween two legitimate users. One is called the sender Alice and the other is the
receiver Bob. The shared keys can secure against all powerful quantum adversary,
even it is powerful enough to perform any operators allowed in quantum physics.
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [1] proposed a protocol to share secret keys by
using quantum method, which is called the BB84 protocol. After that, numerous
QKD protocols have been developed including B92 [2], SARG 04 [3], three states
BB84 [4] and so on. Furthermore, some QKD protocols have been proved to be
unconditionally secure [5,6,7]. In classical cryptography, only the one-time pad
encryption has been proved to have unconditional security. Then we can obtain
unconditionally secure encryption methods by combining QKD with one-time pad.
QKD protocols have showed us that we can share unconditional secure secret
keys between quantum users. It is of great interest to achieve this goal by using
as few “quantum resource” as possible. In 2007, Boyer et al. [8] designed the first
semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol, which can share secure secret
keys between quantum Alice and classical Bob (BKM2007). Here we say Bob is
classical as he is limited to do some classical performance and has no quantum
computational ability. Since their idea of genius, numerous SQKD protocols have
been developed by scholars [9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19]. For instance, Zou
et al. [11] proposed several SQKD protocols with less than four quantum states
based on BKM2007. In Ref. [12], a multi-user protocol was developed which can
make a quantum user A share secure secret keys with several classical users B,C
and so on. A SQKD protocol was proposed based on quantum entanglement in Ref.
[13]. Recently, Zou et al. [17] have presented a new SQKD protocol, in which the
classical Bob has no need to measure any quantum state. Krawec [19] designed a
new SQKD protocol with one quantum state, in which the receiver Bob’s reflection
can contribute to the raw key as well.
In an SQKD protocol, the quantum user Alice sends a quantum state prepared
in arbitrary basis to the other classical user Bob, who is restricted to performing
one of the two operations:
1. Bob chooses to measure and resend (SIFT). He measures the state he received
in the computational basis Z = {|0〉, |1〉} and resends the result state to Alice.
In other words, Bob sends the state |0〉 to Alice when he gets the measurement
outcome 0. Otherwise, he sends |1〉 to Alice.
2. Bob chooses to reflect (CTRL). He just makes the state pass through his own
lab undisturbed and returns it to Alice. Under this circumstance, Bob gets
nothing about the state.
Then Alice chooses to measure the state in arbitrary basis randomly when she
receives it. From the above, we can see Bob resends a quantum state in both of
the two case regardless of his choice. That is to say, there are two-way quantum
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communication channel in an SQKD protocols. The forward channel is from the
sender Alice to the receiver Bob, the reverse one is from Bob to Alice.
Due to the reliance on a two-way quantum communication channel, the security
analysis of SQKD protocols is more difficult than their full quantum counterparts
because the eavesdropper Eve can attack the quantum state twice in the quantum
communication stage. This may greatly increase the possibility for Eve to gain
more information on A or B’s raw key and make the security analysis more com-
plicated. Therefore, most existing SQKD protocols are limited to be proved robust
rather than unconditionally secure. We say a protocol is robust if any attacker can
get nontrivial information on the A or B’s secret keys, his dishonest behavior will
be detected by the legitimate users A and B with nonzero probability [10]. Then
the robustness of SQKD protocols can only assure any attack can be detected, but
it cannot tell us how much noise the protocol can tolerate to distill a secure key
after applying the technique of error correction and privacy amplification.
Recently, the unconditional security of SQKD protocols has attracted more and
more scholars’ attention. Ref. [20] studied the relationship between the disturbance
and the amount of information gained by Eve under the assumption that Eve
just performs individual attacks during the whole quantum communication stage.
Krawec [21] showed that all Eve’s collective attack strategies are equivalent to a
restricted attack operation when Alice just sends the same quantum state that is
known in public in each iteration. In Ref. [22,23], Krawec proved the unconditional
security of BKM2007 by deriving an expression for the key rate as a function of
the quantum channel noise which can be observed by the legitimate users in the
asymptotic scenario. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first unconditional
security proof of an SQKD protocol. Then Krawec [16] proved the unconditional
security of a mediated SQKD protocol allowing two semi-quantum users to share
secure secret keys with the help of a quantum server. It is pointed out that the
unconditional security can be promised even under the circumstance that the
quantum server is an all-powerful adversary. After that, Krawec [19] provided an
unconditional security proof of an SQKD protocol with one quantum state, in
which the classical Bob’s reflection contributes to the raw key as well.
Though some initiate works have been done by some geniuses, there are still
various SQKD protocols that need to be concerned about their unconditional se-
curity. In this paper, we utilize Krawec’s methods first presented in Ref. [21,22] to
analyze the unconditional security of an SQKD protocol with one quantum state
proposed by Zou et al. in Ref. [11]. We also derive an expression for the key rate as
a function of the quantum channel parameters in the asymptotic scenario. Then
we further derive a lower bound of the key rate. Using this bound, we figure out
an error threshold value such that for all error rates less than this threshold value,
the secure secret key can be established between the legitimate users definitely.
Otherwise, the users should abort the protocol. We make an illustration of the
protocol under the circumstance that the reverse quantum channel is a depolar-
izing one with parameter q. Additionally, we compare the error threshold value
with some full quantum protocols and several existing semi-quantum ones whose
unconditional security proofs have been provided recently.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we give some
preliminaries, including some notations and the single-state SQKD protocol pro-
posed in the Ref. [11]. Then we present the whole unconditional security proof
in detail in Section 3. After that, in Section 4 we take an example to make an
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illustration by considering the protocol under the circumstance that the reverse
quantum channel is a depolarizing one with parameter q. Finally, Section 5 makes
a short conclusion and gives some future issues.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations[24,25]
In the interest of readability, we first present some notations which will appear in
the next of this paper.
The computational basis denoted as Z basis is the two state set {|0〉, |1〉}, the
Hadamard basis denoted as X basis is the set {|+〉, |−〉}, where
|+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
, (1)
|−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
. (2)
Given a number z ∈ C, we denote Re(z) and Im(z) as its real and imaginary com-
ponents respectively. If U is a complex matrix (operator), its conjugate transpose
(conjugate) denoted as U∗.
Consider a random variable X and suppose each realization x of X belongs to
the set N = {1, 2, · · · , i, · · · , n}. Let PX(i) be the probability distribution of X,
then the Shannon entropy of X is
H(X) = H(PX(1), · · · , PX(i), · · · , PX(n)) = −
n∑
i=1
PX(i) log2(PX(i)). (3)
Here we give the extra definition 0 log2 0 = 0. If N = 2, then H(X) = h(PX(1)),
where h(x) = H(x,1− x) is the Shannon binary entropy function.
Let ρ be a density operator acting on some finite dimensional Hilbert space H
satisfying
ρ =
n∑
i=1
λi|vi〉〈vi|, (4)
where λi(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) is the i-th eigenvalue of ρ and {|v1〉, |v2〉, · · · , |vn〉} is an
orthonormal basis of H. Then we denote S(ρ) as its von Neumann entropy such
that
S(ρ) = H({λi}i) = −
n∑
i=1
λi log2 λi. (5)
Note that if ρ is a pure state, then S(ρ) = 0 and S(ρ) ≥ 0 holds for arbitrary state
ρ.
Let ρ be a classical quantum state expressed as
ρ =
n∑
i=1
PX(i)|vi〉〈vi| ⊗ ρi. (6)
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Then
S(ρ) = H(PX(i)) +
n∑
i=1
PX(i)S(ρi). (7)
If ρAB is a density operator acting on the bipartite space HA ⊗ HB , we use
S(AB) to denote the von Neumann entropy of ρAB and S(B) the von Neumann
entropy of ρB where S(B) = S(trA(ρAB)). We use S(A|B) to denote the von
Neumann entropy of A’s system conditioned by system B such that
S(A|B) = S(AB)− S(B) = S(ρAB)− S(trA(ρAB)). (8)
Let n be the size of A and B’s raw key of an SQKD protocol, ℓ(n) < n denotes
the size of secure secret key distilled after error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion. Let r denote the key rate in the asymptotic scenario (n→∞), then
r = lim
n→∞
ℓ(n)
n
≥ inf(S(B|E)−H(B|A)), (9)
where H(B|A) is the conditional Shannon entropy and the infimum is over all
collective attacks an eavesdropper Eve can perform. This is the Devetak-Winter
key rate using reverse reconciliation as opposed to the usual direct reconciliation
(S(A|E)−H(A|B)) [19,26,27,28].
2.2 The protocol
In this part, we briefly review the single-state SQKD protocol proposed in Ref.
[11]. In this protocol, the receiver Bob is limited to be semi-quantum or classical.
The protocol consists of the following steps:
1. Alice prepares and sends N quantum states |+〉 to Bob one by one, where
N = 8n(1 + δ), n is the desired length of the raw key, and δ > 0 is a fixed
parameter. Alice sends a quantum state only after receiving the previous one.
2. Bob generates a random string b ∈ {0, 1}N . When the i-th quantum state
arriving, he chooses to CTRL it if bi = 0 or SIFT it if bi = 1.
3. Alice generates a random string c ∈ {0, 1}N . She measures the i-th quantum
state in the Z basis if ci = 0 and measures the i-th quantum state in the X
basis if ci = 1.
4. Alice announces c and Bob announces b. They check the number of SIFT-Z bits
(classical bits are produced by the process that Bob chooses to SIFT and Alice
measures in the Z basis). They abort the protocol if the number of SIFT-Z
bits is less than 2n.
5. Alice checks the error rate on the CTRL-X bits. She and Bob abort the protocol
if the error rate is higher than the predefined threshold Pt.
6. Alice chooses at random n measure result of SIFT-Z bits to be test bits. Alice
and Bob check the error rate on the test bits. They abort the protocol if the
error rate is higher than Pt.
7. Alice and Bob select the first n remaining measure results of SIFT-Z bits to
be used as raw key bits.
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8. Alice announces ECC(error correction code) and PA(privacy amplification)
data, she and Bob use them to extract the ℓ(n)-bit final key from the n-bit raw
key.
Note that, Alice prepares and sends only one quantum state |+〉 to Bob in
each iteration of the protocol. The classical Bob chooses to CTRL or SIFT the
state and Alice chooses to perform a measurement on it in Z or X basis randomly.
When Bob chooses to SIFT and Alice chooses to measure in the Z basis, they
share a bit, in other words, only the SIFT-Z bits contribute to the raw keys.
Note that, to enhance the protocol’s efficiency, we can make Alice choose to
measure in Z basis and Bob choose to SIFT with greater probability, which was
adapted in Ref. [29].
3 Security proof
Three kinds of attack strategies are mainly talked about when analyzing the secu-
rity of QKD protocols, including individual attack, collective attack and general
attack (coherent attack/joint attack). Individual attack is a kind of attack strat-
egy that Eve performs the same operation in each iteration of the protocol and
measures her ancilla immediately; Collective attack is a typical attack strategy
that Eve performs the same operation in each iteration of the protocol, but she
can postpone to measure her ancilla in any future time; General attack is a kind
of powerful attack strategy that Eve can perform any operation allowed by the
laws of quantum physics in each iteration and postpone her measurement on her
ancilla all by herself [30]. Here we concentrate on Eve’s collective attack at first.
3.1 Modeling the protocol
We use HA, HB and HE to denote Alice, Bob and Eve’s Hilbert space respectively.
HT is the Hilbert space of the transit state. Generally, they are all assumed to be
finite. We can use the density operator ρABE =
⊗N
i=1 ρ
i
ABE acting on the Hilbert
space
⊗N (HA⊗HB⊗HE) to denote the mixed state of Alice, Bob and Eve during
the whole quantum communication stage by applying the finite version of quantum
de Finetti representation theorm [31], where ρiABE models the joint system of each
iteration of this protocol. As it is just restricted to the circumstance of collective
attack, we just need to take one iteration for example to prove the unconditional
security.
Krawec has pointed out any collective attack (UF , UR) is equivalent to a re-
striction operation (b, U) where b ∈ [− 1
2
, 1
2
] in a single-state SQKD protocol in Ref.
[21]. UF and UR denote the attack operators performed by Eve in the forward and
reverse channel respectively. U is an unitary operator acting on the joint system
HT ⊗HE . We describe Eve’s restriction attack strategy as follows:
1. Alice prepares and sends state |+〉 to Bob through the forward channel. Eve
intercepts |+〉 and resends another state |e〉 prepared by herself to Bob, where
|e〉 =
√
1
2
+ b|0〉+
√
1
2
− b|1〉. (10)
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2. Bob has two choices when he receives the state |e〉.
Case 1: Bob chooses to CTRL the state, then he reflects it undisturbed to Alice
through the reverse channel. Meanwhile, Eve will capture the transit state and
probe it using unitary operator U acting on the transit state and entangling
it with her own ancilla state. After that Eve resends the transit state to Alice
and keeps the ancilla state in her own memory.
Case 2: Bob chooses to SIFT the state, then Bob will send |0〉 and |1〉 to Alice
with probabilities 1
2
+ b and 1
2
− b respectively. Eve can also perform the attack
like Case 1 during the transmission.
b is a bias parameter, it can be observed by the legitimate users. Eve probes
the state by using a unitary operator U to act on HT ⊗HE as follows:
U |0, 0〉 = |0, e00〉+ |1, e01〉, (11)
U |1, 0〉 = |0, e10〉+ |1, e11〉. (12)
Since U is a unitary operator, we have
〈e00|e10〉+ 〈e01|e11〉 = 0, (13)
〈e00|e00〉+ 〈e01|e01〉 = 〈e10|e10〉+ 〈e11|e11〉 = 1. (14)
In order to illustrate Eve’s attack under the circumstance Bob chooses to CTRL
the state and Alice chooses to measure in X basis, we express |e〉 in X basis as
|e〉 = α+ β√
2
|+〉+ α− β√
2
|−〉, (15)
α =
√
1
2
+ b, β =
√
1
2
− b. (16)
According to Eqs. (11) and (12), we can get
U |+, 0〉 = |+, f+0〉+ |−, f+1〉, (17)
U |−, 0〉 = |+, f−0〉+ |−, f−1〉, (18)
|f+0〉 = 1
2
(|e00〉+ |e01〉+ |e10〉+ |e11〉), (19)
|f+1〉 = 1
2
(|e00〉 − |e01〉+ |e10〉 − |e11〉), (20)
|f−0〉 = 1
2
(|e00〉+ |e01〉 − |e10〉 − |e11〉), (21)
|f−1〉 = 1
2
(|e00〉 − |e01〉 − |e10〉+ |e11〉). (22)
Then we can get
U |e, 0〉 = |+, g+〉+ |−, g−〉, (23)
|g+〉 = α√
2
|e00〉+ α√
2
|e01〉+ β√
2
|e10〉+ β√
2
|e11〉, (24)
|g−〉 = α√
2
|e00〉 − α√
2
|e01〉+ β√
2
|e10〉 − β√
2
|e11〉. (25)
Next, we model one iteration of this protocol as follows:
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1. Alice prepares and sends the state |+〉 to Bob through the forward channel:
ρ1 = |+〉〈+|T . (26)
2. Eve performs the restricted operation UF on the transit state. Accordingly, it
is equivalent to intercept the state |+〉 and resend |e〉 to Bob:
ρ2 = UF |+〉〈+|TU∗F = |e〉〈e|T . (27)
3. Bob’s action:
(1) SIFT:
ρ
S
3 = |0〉〈0|B ⊗ α2|0〉〈0|T + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ β2|1〉〈1|T . (28)
(2) CTRL:
ρ
C
3 = |e〉〈e|T . (29)
4. Eve attacks in the reverse channel:
(1) SIFT:
ρ
S
4 = |0〉〈0|B ⊗ σ1 + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ σ2, (30)
σ1 = α
2
P (|0, e00〉TE + |1, e01〉TE), (31)
σ2 = β
2
P (|0, e10〉TE + |1, e11〉TE), (32)
P (|x〉) = |x〉〈x|. (33)
(2) CTRL:
ρ
C
4 = U |e, 0〉〈e,0|TEU∗ = P (|+, g+〉TE + |−, g−〉TE). (34)
(35)
5. Alice measures in Z or X basis randomly:
(1) SIFT-Z :
ρ
S−Z
5 = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ (|0〉〈0|B ⊗ α2|e00〉〈e00|E + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ β2|e10〉〈e10|E) (36)
+|1〉〈1|A ⊗ (|0〉〈0|B ⊗ α2|e01〉〈e01|E + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ β2|e11〉〈e11|E).
(2) SIFT-X :
ρ
S−X
5 = |+〉〈+|A ⊗ [|0〉〈0|B ⊗
α2
2
σ+0 + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ β
2
2
σ+1] (37)
+|−〉〈−|A ⊗ [|0〉〈0|B ⊗ α
2
2
σ−0 + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ β
2
2
σ−1],
σ+0 = |e00〉〈e00|E + |e00〉〈e01|E + |e01〉〈e00|E + |e01〉〈e01|E , (38)
σ+1 = |e10〉〈e10|E + |e10〉〈e11|E + |e11〉〈e10|E + |e11〉〈e11|E , (39)
σ−0 = |e00〉〈e00|E − |e00〉〈e01|E − |e01〉〈e00|E + |e01〉〈e01|E , (40)
σ−1 = |e10〉〈e10|E − |e10〉〈e11|E − |e11〉〈e10|E + |e11〉〈e11|E . (41)
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(3) CTRL-X :
ρ
C−X
5 = |+〉〈+|A ⊗ |e〉〈e|T ⊗ |g+〉〈g+|E + |−〉〈−|A ⊗ |e〉〈e|T ⊗ |g−〉〈g−|E .(42)
(4) CTRL-Z :
ρ
C−Z
5 = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |e〉〈e|B ⊗ σ0e + |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |e〉〈e|B ⊗ σ1e, (43)
σ0e =
1
2
(|g+〉〈g+|E + |g+〉〈g−|E + |g−〉〈g+|E + |g−〉〈g−|E), (44)
σ1e =
1
2
(|g+〉〈g+|E − |g+〉〈g−|E − |g−〉〈g+|E + |g−〉〈g−|E). (45)
From the protocol we can see only the SIFT-Z bits contribute to the raw key,
we have modeled the process that Bob chooses to SIFT the state and Alice chooses
to measure in the Z basis as Eq. (36). We define P (i, j), i, j ∈ {0, 1} to denote the
probability of the event that Alice and Bob’s raw key bit are i and j respectively,
and then we can get
P (0,0) = tr[(|0,0〉〈0,0|AB ⊗ I)ρS−Z5 ] = α2〈e00|e00〉 = (
1
2
+ b)〈e00|e00〉, (46)
P (0,1) = tr[(|0,1〉〈0,1|AB ⊗ I)ρS−Z5 ] = β2〈e10|e10〉 = (
1
2
− b)〈e10|e10〉, (47)
P (1,0) = tr[(|1,0〉〈1,0|AB ⊗ I)ρS−Z5 ] = α2〈e01|e01〉 = (
1
2
+ b)〈e01|e01〉, (48)
P (1,1) = tr[(|1,1〉〈1,1|AB ⊗ I)ρS−Z5 ] = β2〈e11|e11〉 = (
1
2
− b)〈e11|e11〉. (49)
3.2 Bounding the final key rate
Considering only the SIFT-Z bits can contribute to the raw key, then the state of
the joint system after an iteration of the protocol is
ρABE = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ (|0〉〈0|B ⊗ α2|e00〉〈e00|E + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ β2|e10〉〈e10|E) (50)
+|1〉〈1|A ⊗ (|0〉〈0|B ⊗ α2|e01〉〈e01|E + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ β2|e11〉〈e11|E).
According to Eq. (9), inf (S(B|E) − H(B|A)) is a lower bound of the key rate r.
Due to the strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy expressed as
S(B|E) ≥ S(B|ME), (51)
we can get
r = lim
N→∞
ℓ(N)
N
≥ inf(S(B|E)−H(B|A)) ≥ inf(S(B|ME)−H(B|A)), (52)
where M is a new system introduced into to form a compound system ABME.
Then we introduce a new system M modeled by a two-dimensional Hilbert space
spanned by the orthonormal basis {|0〉, |1〉}. We use the operator |i〉〈i|M , i ∈ {0, 1}
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to register the xor operation of A and B’s raw key bit. We express the mixed state
of the system ABME as
ρABME = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B ⊗ |0〉〈0|M ⊗ α2|e00〉〈e00|E (53)
+|0〉〈0|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B ⊗ |1〉〈1|M ⊗ β2|e10〉〈e10|E
+|1〉〈1|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B ⊗ |1〉〈1|M ⊗ α2|e01〉〈e01|E
+|1〉〈1|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B ⊗ |0〉〈0|M ⊗ β2|e11〉〈e11|E .
Tracing out the system A, we can get the state ρBME as
ρBME = |0〉〈0|B ⊗ [|0〉〈0|M ⊗ α2|e00〉〈e00|E + |1〉〈1|M ⊗ α2|e01〉〈e01|E ] (54)
+|1〉〈1|B ⊗ [|1〉〈1|M ⊗ β2|e10〉〈e10|E + |0〉〈0|M ⊗ β2|e11〉〈e11|E ].
Then we get ρME as
ρME = trB(ρBME) = k1|0〉〈0|M ⊗ ρ0E + k2|1〉〈1|M ⊗ ρ1E , (55)
k1 = P (0,0) + P (1,1), (56)
k2 = P (0,1) + P (1,0), (57)
ρ
0
E =
α2|e00〉〈e00|E + β2|e11〉〈e11|E
P (0,0) + P (1,1)
, (58)
ρ
1
E =
α2|e01〉〈e01|E + β2|e10〉〈e10|E
P (0,1) + P (1,0)
. (59)
Next, we need to compute the von Neumann entropies of the system BME
and system ME. In order to compute S(ρBME), we rewrite ρBME as a classical
quantum state as
ρBME = P (0,0)|0,0〉〈0,0|BM ⊗ ρ00E + P (0,1)|1,1〉〈1,1|BM ⊗ ρ01E (60)
+P (1,0)|0,1〉〈0,1|BM ⊗ ρ10E + P (1,1)|1,0〉〈1,0|BM ⊗ ρ11E ,
ρ
00
E =
|e00〉〈e00|E
〈e00|e00〉 , ρ
01
E =
|e10〉〈e10|E
〈e10|e10〉 , (61)
ρ
10
E =
|e01〉〈e01|E
〈e01|e01〉 , ρ
11
E =
|e11〉〈e11|E
〈e11|e11〉 . (62)
Because ρijE , i, j ∈ {0, 1} are all pure state, S(ρijE) = 0. According to Eq. (7), we
can figure out
S(BME) = S(ρBME) = H(P (0,0), P (0,1), P (1,0), P (1,1)). (63)
Next, we compute S(ME) as
S(ME) = k0 + k1S(ρ
0
E) + k2S(ρ
1
E), (64)
k0 = h(P (0,0) + P (1,1)). (65)
As k2 = P (0,1)+P (1,0) is considered as the error rate in the SIFT-Z bits, it should
be very small; otherwise, the protocol will be aborted. ρ1E is a two-dimensional
density operator, then
S(ρ1E) ≤ 1. (66)
Security of a single-state semi-quantum key distribution protocol 11
Therefore, we can bound S(ME) as
S(ME) = k0 + k1S(ρ
0
E) + k2S(ρ
1
E) ≤ k0 + k2 + k1S(ρ0E). (67)
According to Eqs. (8)(52)(63)(67), we can get
r ≥ H(P (i, j)ij)− k0 − k2 − k1S(ρ0E)−H(B|A). (68)
Then we can compute a lower bound of the key rate r by finding an upper bound
on S(ρ0E).
Let α|e00〉 = x|ξ〉 and β|e11〉 = y|ξ〉 + z|η〉, where x, y, z ∈ C, 〈ξ|ξ〉 = 〈η|η〉 = 1
and 〈ξ|η〉 = 0. Then we can get
|x|2 = α2〈e00|e00〉 = P (0,0), (69)
|y|2 + |z|2 = β2〈e11|e11〉 = P (1,1), (70)
x
∗
y = αβ〈e00|e11〉, (71)
|y|2 = α
2β2|〈e00|e11〉|2
|x|2 . (72)
In the basis of {|ξ〉, |η〉}, we can write ρ0E as
ρ
0
E =
1
|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2
( |x|2 + |y|2, yz∗
y∗z , |z|2
)
. (73)
Its eigenvalues are
λ± =
1
2
±
√
|x|4 + |y|4 + |z|4 + 2|x|2|y|2 + 2|y|2|z|2 − 2|x|2|z|2
2(|x|2 + |y|2 + |z|2) . (74)
Then we can get
λ± =
1
2
±
√
(P (0,0)− P (1,1))2 + 4α2β2|〈e00|e11〉|2
2(P (0,0) + P (1,1))
(75)
according to Eqs. (65), (66), (67) and (68). Thus, we have
S(ρ0E) = h(λ+) (76)
which is a bound for α2β2|〈e00|e11〉|2. From Eq. (75), we can see λ+ ≥ 12 , and
then as λ+ decreases, h(λ+) increases. We can use α
2β2|〈e00|e11〉|2’s lower bound
to find an upper bound of S(ρ0E). Assume B ≥ 0 is a lower bound of αβ|〈e00|e11〉|
and define
λ =
1
2
+
√
(P (0,0)− P (1,1))2 + 4B2
2(P (0,0) + P (1,1))
, (77)
then have
S(ME) ≤ k0 + k2 + k1h(λ). (78)
Next, we compute H(B|A) by the observable statistics P (i, j)ij . We can easily
get
H(BA) = H({P (i, j)}ij). (79)
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We can get
PA(0) = P (0,0) + P (0,1), (80)
PA(1) = P (1,0) + P (1,1), (81)
and,
H(A) = h(PA(0)) = h(P (0,0) + P (0,1)). (82)
Thus,
H(B|A) = H(BA)−H(A) = H({P (i, j)}ij)− h(P (0,0) + P (0,1)). (83)
Therefore, we can bound the final key rate as
r ≥ h(P (0,0) + P (0,1))− k0 − k2 − k1h(λ). (84)
From the above inequality, we can see all the parameters can be estimated by A
and B except αβ|〈e00|e11〉|’s lower bound B. Next, we also consider to use some
other observable statistics to determine a value of B.
3.3 Bounding αβ|〈e00|e11〉| using observable statistics
In the previous subsection, we mainly concern with the SIFT-Z process of the
protocol. Now we begin to talk on some other ones by using some mismatched
measurements [32,33,34,35,36].
Firstly, we consider the process of CTRL-X. According to the protocol, we will
abort it when there is too much noise in the quantum communication channel.
Then the legitimate users can estimate noise of the X-basis type in this step.
Specifically, if Bob chooses to CTRL the state and Alice chooses to measure in
X basis and gets the outcome |−〉, it is considered as a mistake because of the
channel noise. We use P (e,−) to denote the probability of the event Alice gets −
in the CTRL-X process, we can compute it as
P (e,−) = tr[(|−〉〈−|A ⊗ |e〉〈e|T ⊗ I)ρC−X5 ] = 〈g−|g−〉 =
1
2
− k3. (85)
k3 = α
2
Re〈e00|e01〉+ αβRe〈e00|e11〉+ αβRe〈e01|e10〉+ β2Re〈e10|e11〉. (86)
Thus we can specify αβRe〈e00|e11〉 as
αβRe〈e00|e11〉 = 1
2
− P (e,−)− k4. (87)
k4 = α
2
Re〈e00|e01〉+ αβRe〈e01|e10〉+ β2Re〈e10|e11〉. (88)
From Eqs. (87) and (88), we can see the right side of the Eq. (87) contains the
parameters α2Re〈e00|e01〉, αβRe〈e01|e10〉 and β2Re〈e10|e11〉. Next, we use the ob-
servable statistics to specify them one by one.
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1. α2Re〈e00|e01〉 :
Let P (0,+) denote the probability of the event Alice gets the outcome + when
Bob resends |0〉 in the SIFT-X process. Then we can get
P (0,+) = tr[(|+〉〈+|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|T ⊗ I)ρS−X5 ] =
α2
2
+ α2Re〈e00|e01〉. (89)
Then α2Re〈e00|e01〉 can be specified by
α
2
Re〈e00|e01〉 = P (0,+)− α
2
2
. (90)
2. β2Re〈e10|e11〉 :
Let P (1,+) denote the probability of the event Alice get the outcome + when
Bob resends |1〉 in the SIFT-X process. Then we can get
P (1,+) = tr[(|+〉〈+|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|T ⊗ I)ρS−X5 ] =
β2
2
+ β2Re〈e10|e11〉. (91)
Thus,
β
2
Re〈e10|e11〉 = P (1,+)− β
2
2
. (92)
3. αβRe〈e01|e10〉 :
Here we cannot specify αβRe〈e01|e10〉 exactly, but we can bound it using the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality as
αβRe〈e01|e10〉 ≤
√
α2β2〈e01|e01〉〈e10|e10〉 =
√
P (0,1)P (1,0). (93)
Then we can bound αβ〈e00|e11〉 as
αβRe〈e00|e11〉 ≥ 1− P (e,−)− P (0,+)− P (1,+)−
√
P (0,1)P (1,0). (94)
Here we define B as
B = 1− P (e,−)− P (0,+)− P (1,+)−
√
P (0,1)P (1,0). (95)
Then we can ensure B > 0 by controlling the quantum channel noise because all the
observable statistics are determined by the quantum channel from Bob to Alice. If
the channel is too noisy, it will be aborted definitely. Thus, we can get the lower
bound on αβ|〈e00|e11〉| because of
αβ|〈e00|e11〉| = αβ
√
Re2(〈e00|e11〉) + Im2(〈e00|e11〉) (96)
≥ αβ|Re〈e00|e11〉| ≥ αβRe〈e00|e11〉 ≥ B.
From above, we have got a lower bound of the key rate r, which is expressed
as a function of parameters determined by the quantum channel. According to
this bound, we can compute a threshold value such that the secret keys can be
established successfully as long as all the error rates are below this value. Then
the security proof restricted on Eve’s collective attack is finished.
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3.4 Security on the circumstance of general attack
In order to get the full unconditional security proof, we need to spread it to the
circumstance that Eve can perform the most powerful attack strategy - general
attack. Renner et al [26] have pointed out that it suffices to consider the collec-
tive attacks when analyzing the full security of the QKD protocols which are with
the character of permutation invariant. Renner et al [26] have also analyzed the
unconditional security of BB84, B92 and six-state QKD protocols with one-way
error correction and privacy amplification by using this method. Here we declare
that all above hold still in the case of general attack since the protocol is also
permutation invariant. Though this SQKD protocol relies on the two-way quan-
tum channel, Krawec [21] has proved that all attacks in the forward channel are
equivalent to a restricted attack. That is to say, Alice sending |+〉 to Bob through
the forward channel is equal to Bob preparing a state |e〉. Then the SQKD protocol
can be reduced to a fully QKD protocol that Bob prepares and sends a state of
a set {|0〉, |1〉, |e〉} to Alice with a certain probability, Alice chooses to perform a
Z-basis or X-basis measurement randomly when she receives a state from Bob.
Additionally, only the SIFT-Z bits contribute to the raw key in the SQKD proto-
col. It is indicated that Bob’s sending |e〉 to Alice is only to check the channel noise
in the reduced QKD protocol. Thus, the reduced QKD protocol can be considered
as part of BB84 protocol with an additional channel noise checking process. Then
we can infer that the SQKD protocol is permutation invariant as well. The full
security analysis is completed.
4 An Example
Here we demonstrate how to compute a lower bound of the final key rate r in
asymptotic scenario under the circumstance that the reverse channel is a depo-
larizing one with parameter q. The depolarization channel is a typical scenario
considered in the unconditional security proofs of some other protocols [19,37,38].
It acts on two-dimensional density operators ρ as follows:
ξq(ρ) = (1− q)ρ+ q
2
I, (97)
where I is the identity operator.
We model Eve’s attack in the reverse channel of the protocol briefly under this
circumstance as follows:
1. SIFT :
ρS = α
2|0〉〈0|B ⊗ ξq(|0〉〈0|T ) + β2|1〉〈1|B ⊗ ξq(|1〉〈1|T ) (98)
= (1− q
2
)α2|0, 0〉〈0,0|BT + q2α
2|0, 1〉〈0,1|BT
+
q
2
β
2|1, 0〉〈1,0|BT + (1− q2)β
2|1, 1〉〈1,1|BT .
2. CTRL :
ρC = ξq(|e〉〈e|T ) = (1− q)|e〉〈e|T + q2(|e〉〈e|T + |e
⊥〉〈e⊥|T ), (99)
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where |e⊥〉 is a state orthogonal to |e〉, that is to say,
|e⊥〉 =
√
1
2
− b|0〉 −
√
1
2
+ b|1〉. (100)
Then we can get
P (0,+) = tr[(|0,+〉〈0,+|BT )ρS] = α
2
2
, (101)
P (1,+) = tr[(|1,+〉〈1,+|BT )ρS] = β
2
2
, (102)
P (e,−) = tr[(|−〉〈−|T )ρC ] = 12 +
(q − 1)
2
√
1− 4b2, (103)
P (0,0) = tr[(|0,0〉〈0,0|BT )ρS] = (12 + b)(1−
q
2
), (104)
P (0,1) = tr[(|1,0〉〈1,0|BT )ρS] = (12 − b)
q
2
, (105)
P (1,0) = tr[(|0,1〉〈0,1|BT )ρS] = (12 + b)
q
2
, (106)
P (1,1) = tr[(|1,1〉〈1,1|BT )ρS] = (12 − b)(1−
q
2
). (107)
Thus, we can get B as
B = (1
2
− 3q
4
)
√
1− 4b2. (108)
Note that we can do some efforts to restrict the channel parameters b and q to
ensure B is positive. Here, we only need to assume q < 2
3
. Then B will always be
positive. This assumption is reasonable. If q > 2
3
, the reverse channel is too noisy
to share secret keys, and then we have to abort it. After that we can further get
λ according to Eq. (77) as
λ =
1
2
+
√
b2(2− q)2 + 4B2
2− q . (109)
Finally, we can get a lower bound of the key rate r expressed as a function of
parameters b and q:
r ≥ f(b, q) = h(1
2
+ b− bq)− h(1− q
2
)− q
2
− (1− q
2
)h(λ). (110)
A graph of the lower bound f(b, q) as a function of q for different values of b
is shown in figure 1. In the graph, we can see when b = 0, f(b, q) is positive for
all q ≤ 0.193, which means that when the error rate QZ = q2 ≤ 9.65%, the key
rate will always be positive. Different values of b corresponds to different threshold
values. We can see when the absolute value of b is far from 0, the threshold value
becomes smaller. When |b| > 0.36, f(b, q) will always be negative for arbitrary q,
it means that the key rate r cannot be guaranteed to be positive. In fact, the bias
parameter b can specify the amount of noise in the forward channel in some extent
as it can introduce into the X-type error rate denoted by QX , which means Bob
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Fig. 1 A graph of f(b, q) as a function of the depolarization channel parameter q for different
values of b. Note that, the error rate QZ =
q
2
.
may observe |−〉 when Alice sends the state |+〉 through the forward channel. We
can compute it as
QX = tr(|−〉〈−||e〉〈e|) = 12 −
√
1
4
− b2. (111)
From above, we can see the maximum error rate QX in the forward channel is no
more than 15.3% to make sure the key rate r is always positive.
We use Figure 2 to illustrate f(b, q) as a function of the bias parameter b for
different values of q. Indeed, we can see when q = 0, the key rate is positive for
all |b| < 0.36. But when q > 0.2, f(b, q) will always be negative. It means that the
maximum error rate QZ of the reverse channel is no more than 10%. These may
satisfy the fact that the SQKD protocol can tolerate more noise in the forward
channel than the reverse one. However, the error rate QX in the forward channel
is not bound to cause an error of the raw key bit directly, maybe it is another
reason that the forward channel can endure more error rate than the reverse one
of this protocol. In any case, it tell us that we need to make more effort to control
the channel noise in the reverse direction than the forward when we implement
this protocol in practice.
Compared with some other protocols, this protocol can tolerate more noise. As
we know, B92 can tolerate up to 6.50% , giving an optimal choice of states [38].
With respect to Krawec’s SQKD protocol in Ref. [19], it can tolerate up to 5.36%
error assuming there is no noise in the forward channel. In our proof, we can see
this single-state protocol can tolerate up to 9.65% error in case of the forward
channel existing no noise. Recently, the original SQKD protocol of Boyer et al.
has been shown to support up to 11% error rate [36], in contrast, Boyer’s protocol
requires Alice to prepare and send multiple states.
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Fig. 2 A graph of f(b, q) as a function of b under the circumstance that the reverse channel
is a depolarization channel of parameter q.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided an unconditional security proof of a single state
SQKD protocol proposed in Ref. [11] completely from information theory aspect.
We have computed a lower bound of the key rate in the asymptotic scenario and
derived a threshold value of errors that the protocol can tolerate. It has been
showed that the secret keys can be shared successfully as long as all the channel
noise in the quantum communication stage is smaller than this threshold value.
Then we have made an illustration under the circumstance that the reverse channel
is a depolarizing channel with parameter q and showed that the SQKD protocol
can sustain no more than 9.65% error rate assuming that there is no noise in the
forward channel. However, we have discussed the unconditional security of the
protocol just under the circumstance of perfect quantum state scenario. Therefore
it is a challenge work for us to consider the unperfect scenario in the future.
Meanwhile, we have only computed the key rate in the asymptotic scenario, as a
consequence, the security of the protocol with finite quantum resource is another
interesting problem worth considering in the future.
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